卡梅倫"緊縮論"站不住腳

David Cameron’s “there is no alternative” speech last week on the UK economy has aroused much criticism. This is justified. The British prime minister’s arguments for sticking to the government’s programme of fiscal austerity were overwhelmingly wrong-headed.

戴維·卡梅倫(David Cameron)近期講到英國經濟時聲稱“別無選擇”，引發了諸多批評。批評是合理的。英國首相用於論述政府應當堅持財政緊縮計劃的理由都大錯特錯。

It is easy to understand why he had to defend the government’s failing flagship policy. The incoming coalition embarked on a programme of austerity with the emergency Budget of June 2010. The economy, then showing signs of recovery, has since stagnated. Even the fiscal outcomes are poor. Indeed, according to the latest Green Budget from the authoritative Institute for Fiscal Studies, this fiscal year’s borrowing requirement may be bigger than last year’s. Only a productivity collapse saved the day – by keeping unemployment surprisingly low, ameliorating the social impact of the output disaster.

不難理解卡梅倫爲何一定要爲政府失敗的主打政策辯護。當初，剛上臺的聯合政府頒佈2010年6月緊急預算案，開始實施緊縮計劃。從那以後，原本顯示出復甦跡象的英國經濟陷入停滯。甚至連政府的財政狀況也很糟糕。根據權威機構英國財政研究所(Institute for Fiscal Studies)最新的《綠色預算》(Green Budget)，本財年的借款需求可能高於上個財年。只有生產率暴跌才能拯救危局——維持超低的失業率，改善產出困境對社會的影響。

How does one defend this record· Simon Wren-Lewis of the University of Oxford and Jonathan Portes of the National Institute of Economic and Social Research, among others, have demolished the prime minister’s views. Here are the key points.

這樣糟糕的記錄要如何爲之辯護？牛津大學(University of Oxford)的西蒙·雷恩-劉易斯(Simon Wren-Lewis)和英國國家經濟社會研究院(National Institute of Economic and Social Research)的喬納森·波特斯(Jonathan Portes)等人反駁了首相的觀點。以下爲要點。

Mr Cameron argues that those who think the government can borrow more “think there’s some magic money tree. Well, let me tell you a plain truth: there isn’t.” This is quite wrong. First, there is a money tree, called the Bank of England, which has created ￡375bn to finance its asset purchases. Second, like other solvent institutions, governments can borrow. Third, markets deem the government solvent, since they are willing to lend to it at the lowest rates in UK history. And, finally, markets are doing this because of the structural financial surpluses in the private and foreign sectors.

卡梅倫稱，認爲政府可以擴大借款的人們“以爲有一棵魔法搖錢樹。好吧，讓我告訴你們一個簡單的事實：沒有這樣一棵樹”。這種說法是錯誤的。首先，搖錢樹的確是存在的，它名叫“英格蘭銀行”(BoE)，已經創造出3750億英鎊，爲資產購買活動提供資金支持。其次，正如其他有償還能力的機構一樣，政府能夠借款。第三，市場認爲政府是有償還能力的，因爲它們願意以英國曆史上最低的利率借給政府資金。最後，市場這樣做，是因爲私營和對外部門存在結構性財政結餘。

Again, Mr Cameron notes that “last month’s downgrade was the starkest possible reminder of the debt problem we face”. No, it is not, for three reasons. First, Moody’s stressed that the big problem for the UK was the sluggish economic growth in the medium term, which austerity has made worse. Second, the rating of a sovereign that cannot default on debt in its own currency means little. Third, the reason for believing long-term interest rates will rise is expectations of high inflation and so higher short-term rates. But such a shift is going to follow a recovery, which would make austerity effective and timely.

卡梅倫再次提到，“上個月的評級下調將我們所面臨的債務問題展露無遺”。三點原因可證明這一說法的謬誤。首先，穆迪(Moody's)強調英國的主要問題是中期經濟增長疲軟，而緊縮已使之雪上加霜。其次，主權國家以本國貨幣計價的債務是無法違約的，因此對其進行評級缺乏意義。第三，認爲長期利率將上升，是因爲預計將出現高通脹和短期利率上升。但這一變化將是隨復甦而發生的，在那種情況下緊縮將是有效、切合時宜的。

Mr Cameron also argued: “As the independent Office for Budget Responsibility has made clear·.·.·.· growth has been depressed by the financial crisis·.·.·.·and the problems in the eurozone·.·.·.·and a 60 per cent rise in oil prices between August 2010 and April 2011. They are absolutely clear that the deficit reduction plan is not responsible.” This brought a rejoinder from Robert Chote, OBR director, who noted that: “Every forecast published by the OBR since the June 2010 Budget has incorporated the widely held assumption that tax increases and spending cuts reduce economic growth in the short term.”

卡梅倫還認爲：“獨立機構‘預算責任辦公室’(Office for Budget Responsibility, OBR)明確表示……金融危機……歐元區問題……以及2010年8月至2011年4月間油價上漲60%等因素抑制了經濟增長。他們非常清楚，削減赤字計劃並非原因所在。”預算責任辦公室主任羅伯特·喬特(Robert Chote)對此的迴應是：“2010年6月預算案出臺以來，OBR發佈的每一份預測均秉持一項被廣泛認同的假設：增稅和減支在短期內會降低經濟增長率。”

Serious researchers, including at international organisations, argue that the multiplier effect of fiscal austerity may be far bigger than the OBR has hitherto assumed, at least in today’s depressed circumstances. Moreover, even if the OBR believes the outcome turned out worse than forecast because of adverse shocks, rather than its underestimation of multipliers, this is an argument for active policy, not against it.

嚴肅的研究人員（包括國際組織的研究人員）認爲，財政緊縮的乘數效應可能遠高於OBR迄今的假設值，至少在當今疲軟的經濟環境下是這種狀況。此外，即便OBR認爲結果不如預期的原因是負面衝擊，而非其低估乘數效應，這也是支持、而不是反對積極政策的理由。

The prime minister also stated: “[Labour] think that by borrowing more they would miraculously end up borrowing less·.·.·.·Yes, it really is as incredible as that.” What truly is incredible is that Mr Cameron cannot understand that, if an entity that spends close to half of gross domestic product retrenches as the private sector is also retrenching, the decline in overall output may be so large that its finances end up worse than when it started. Bradford DeLong of Berkeley and Larry Summers, the former US Treasury secretary, have shown that, in a depressed economy, what Mr Cameron deems incredible is likely to be true. A recent International Monetary Fund paper argues that “fiscal tightening could raise the debt ratio in the short term, as fiscal gains are partly wiped out by the decline in output”. Mr Portes adds that, even if this is not true for the UK on its own, it is likely to be true for Europe since almost everybody is retrenching simultaneously.

首相還聲稱：“工黨認爲增加借款最後能奇蹟般地起到減少借款的效果……是的，這令人難以置信。”但真正令人難以置信的是，卡梅倫無法理解，如果一個支出佔國內生產總值(GDP)近半的政府隨着私營部門一起削減開支，這將大大降低總產出，使得政府最終的財政狀況還不及當初。伯克利(Berkeley)的布拉德福德·德隆(Bradford DeLong)和美國前財長拉里·薩默斯(Larry Summers)證明，當經濟不景氣時，在卡梅倫看來難以置信的事情可能成爲現實。國際貨幣基金組織(IMF)近期的一篇論文認爲，“財政緊縮在短期內可能導致債務比率升高，因爲財政改善會被產出下降部分地抵消掉。”波特斯補充道，即便英國不出現這種狀況，就整個歐洲而言也可能出現這種狀況，因爲幾乎各方都在同時減支。

Mr Cameron argues that “this deficit didn’t suddenly appear purely as a result of the global financial crisis. It was driven by persistent, reckless and completely unaffordable government spending and borrowing over many years.” In a way, this is the most worrying error – not because the fiscal policy of the Labour party, then in power, was perfect. Far from it. Fiscal policy should have been tighter. But that is not the main reason the UK has a huge structural deficit.

卡梅倫認爲，“赤字不是單純因爲全球金融危機而突然產生的，其根源是多年來政府進行持續、不顧後果、完全無法承擔的支出和借款。”在某種程度上，這是最令人擔憂的錯誤——原因並非當時執政黨工黨的財政政策無懈可擊。工黨當時的財政政策遠非完美——它本該更加緊縮。但這並非英國產生高額結構性赤字的主要原因。

It is the economy, stupid. In 2007, according to the IMF, UK net debt – at 38 per cent of GDP – was the second-lowest in the Group of Seven leading economies. These levels were also exceptionally low by UK historical standards. In the March 2008 Budget, the Treasury estimated the structural cyclically adjusted deficit on the current budget at minus 0.7 per cent in 2007-08 and minus 0.5 per cent in 2008-09. The collapse in output has caused the explosion in deficits and debt. Almost everybody underestimated the vulnerability, the Conservative leadership among them: pre-crisis, it committed itself to continuing the plans that Mr Cameron now calls “reckless and unaffordable”.

問題是經濟，笨蛋。根據IMF的數據，2007年英國淨債務爲GDP的38%，爲七國集團(Group of Seven)第二低。按照英國曆史標準衡量，這個比例也是非常低的。英國財政部在2008年3月預算案中估計，經週期調整的結構性經常預算赤字比例在2007-08年度爲-0.7%，在2008-09年度爲的-0.5%。產出大幅下降，導致了赤字和債務劇增。幾乎所有人都低估了經濟的脆弱性，保守黨領導層也不例外：在危機前，它延續瞭如今被卡梅倫稱爲“不顧後果、無法承擔”的計劃。

Some think reckless spending explains the jump in government spending from 40.7 per cent of GDP in 2007-08 to 47.4 per cent two years later. Yet, between 1996-97 (the year before Labour came into office) and 2007-08 (the year before the crisis), the share of spending in GDP rose by only 1.2 per cent. No: the collapse in GDP, relative to expectations, caused the jump in spending and decline in receipts, relative to GDP. The Green Budget compares the forecasts for 2012-13 made in the 2008 Budget and the 2012 Autumn Statement: nominal GDP is down 13.6 per cent, receipts are down 17.6 per cent, spending is down 5.6 per cent and borrowing is up 372 per cent. It is because the OBR (and others) believe most of this lost GDP is permanent that the position seems so grim. (See charts.)

有人認爲，不顧後果的支出能夠解釋政府支出佔GDP比例從2007-08年度的40.7%大幅升至兩年後的47.4%。然而，在1996-97年度（工黨上臺的前一年）和2007-08年度（危機發生的前一年）之間，支出佔GDP的比例僅上升了1.2%。不！GDP相對預期的大幅下跌纔是支出上升、收入下降（相對於GDP)的根源。《綠色預算》比較了2008年預算案和2012年秋季預算報告對2012-13年度的預測：名義GDP減少13.6%，收入減少17.6%，支出減少5.6%，借款增加372%。OBR（和其他機構）認爲GDP的下降大部分將是長期化的，因此情況才顯得如此嚴峻。（見圖）

Mr Cameron’s argument against fiscal policy flexibility is wrong. But, beyond this, we have to consider why the economy has proved so fragile and rebalancing so difficult. That is for next week.

卡梅倫反對財政政策靈活性的理由是錯誤的。但我們也必須思考：爲何經濟表現得如此脆弱，而再平衡是如此困難？這是下一篇專欄的內容。