打擊ISIS緣何治標不治本 Calming the Syrian war is more pressing than Assads fate

The spillover of the Syrian refugee crisis to Europe, followed by the Sinai, Beirut, and Paris attacks, demonstrate tragically that the threat posed by Isis has not been contained. It may be true that the organisation is turning its fire abroad because, thanks to international coalition efforts, it can no longer take territory in the region. But that will be small comfort if the result is only more attacks in Europe.

敘利亞難民危機導致大量人口流入歐洲——以及隨後在西奈、貝魯特和巴黎發生的恐怖襲擊——以慘痛的方式表明，“伊斯蘭國”(ISIS)構成的威脅沒有被遏制住。該組織正將槍口轉向海外是因爲其無法再在該地區控制領土——多虧了國際聯盟的努力——這或許是事實。但是，如果結果只是使歐洲遭遇更多襲擊，這也只能算是小小的安慰。

Critics of existing efforts to defeat Isis have thus begun to clamour for a new strategy. The problem is that most of their proposals consist of what the United States and its partners are already doing: conducting air strikes, blocking foreign fighters and financing, countering extremist ideology, and sharing intelligence. While these efforts can and should be intensified, adding a few more coalition aeroplanes, forward air controllers, or media advisers is not going to fundamentally change the campaign’s trajectory.

批評現有打擊ISIS努力的人因此開始呼籲採取新策略。問題在於他們提出的多數建議都是美國及其盟友已經在做的事：實施空襲、阻止外國戰士加入ISIS並堵住該組織獲取資金的渠道，打擊極端主義意識形態、以及情報共享。儘管這些努力有可能、也理應有所加強，但是部署更多聯盟飛機、前線空中管制(forward air controller)、或是媒體顧問，無法從根本上改變打擊ISIS行動的軌跡。

The problem is not that these efforts are misplaced, it is that they target the symptoms of the problem rather than its cause. That cause, to simplify, is that tens of millions of Sunni Muslims living between Damascus and Baghdad — and millions more in Europe and elsewhere — are resentful, insecure and humiliated by the politics of the region. A small but growing minority has concluded that the only way to address the injustice they perceive is to rally to the perverted cause of the Isis.

問題不是這些努力不適當，而是它們只治標而不治本。簡單來說，根本問題就是那些生活在大馬士革和巴格達之間的數以千萬計的——在歐洲及其他地區還有數百萬——遜尼派穆斯林，他們憤怒又沒有安全保障，在政治上飽受羞辱。規模較小但是人數不斷增多的少數派得出結論：要解決他們所遭受的不公，唯一途徑是與ISIS非正道的使命同仇敵愾。

The problem of disaffected Sunni Muslims is hardly new, but it exploded after the 2003 invasion of Iraq and the decision to disband the Iraqi army. Those moves put a major Arab power under Iranian and Shia control and disenfranchised thousands of armed Sunni men. Afterwards, Shia Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki governed in a sectarian, non-inclusive fashion, driving many Iraqi Sunnis to join an earlier version of Isis, al-Qaeda, in Iraq. In June 2014, when a significant portion of the Sunni population of the city of Mosul sided with the invading Isis against their own government, it was clear efforts to make Iraqi Sunnis feel included had failed.

遜尼派穆斯林的不滿算不上什麼新鮮事，但是在2003年西方入侵伊拉克、以及決定解散伊拉克軍隊之後，問題就變大了。這些舉動將一個阿拉伯大國置於伊朗人和什葉派的控制之下，並且剝奪了成千上萬的遜尼派武裝分子的選舉權。此後，伊拉克什葉派總理努裏氠利基(Nouri al-Maliki)大搞教派主義，實行非包容的政策，促使很多伊拉克遜尼派加入了早期版本的ISIS——基地組織(al-Qaeda)。2014年6月，當摩蘇爾市(Mosul)很大一部分的遜尼派與入侵的ISIS並肩對抗伊拉克政府時，旨在使伊拉克遜尼派感覺融入的努力顯然已經失敗。

The war in Syria has vastly exacerbated the problem. There, the Bashar al-Assad regime, backed by Shia Iran and Hizbollah, is savagely repressing a largely Sunni opposition. This wanton killing is an inspiration not just for Syrian Sunnis but for foreign fighters flowing to the region, ready to die, and kill, for their cause.

敘利亞戰爭使問題嚴重惡化。在敘利亞，以什葉派爲主的伊朗和真主黨(Hizbollah)所支持的巴沙爾阿薩德(Bashar al-Assad)政權，野蠻地鎮壓主要爲遜尼派的反對派。這種肆意殺戮不僅激起了敘利亞遜尼派的反抗，而且使涌入該地區的外國戰士隨時準備爲了他們的使命而赴死和殺戮。

Seen in these terms, the strategy we are pursuing, even if bolstered by further military action, will not destroy Isis. The conflicts and injustices in Iraq and Syria are attracting more recruits than we can possibly capture or kill.

以此看來，我們目前實行的策略即便有進一步軍事行動的支撐，也不會摧毀ISIS。伊拉克和敘利亞的衝突和不公正現象正吸引着越來越多的新成員追隨ISIS，我們不可能將之全部逮捕或消滅。

To deal with the causes of Isis and not the symptoms, two things are essential. The first is to empower the Sunnis of Iraq. The Baghdad government must urgently deliver on its pledges to revise outdated de-Baathification laws, employ more Sunni tribal fighters, create a National Guard, end the disproportionate detention of Sunnis, and put more police on the streets of Sunni areas. Delivering more humanitarian aid to areas freed from Isis control, and curbing the abuses of Shia militia, would also make a huge difference.

要從ISIS的發展根源（而非表面症狀）入手，有兩件事是必不可少的。第一件是向伊拉克遜尼派放權。伊拉克政府必須儘快兌現其修訂過時的“非復興社會黨化”相關法律的承諾，啓用更多的遜尼派部落戰士，建立國民警衛隊(National Guard)，結束大力拘捕遜尼派的行爲，並且在遜尼派聚居區的街道部署更多警力。向脫離ISIS控制的區域提供更多的人道主義援助、同時阻止什葉派民兵組織的虐待行爲，這也會帶來巨大改變。

In Syria, the overwhelming priority needs to be on de-escalating the conflict, even if that means deferring the question of Mr Assad’s ultimate fate. The Vienna talks, for the first time including both Iran and Saudi Arabia, are a good start. A ceasefire that allows for local governance, makes humanitarian assistance possible, ends the regime’s daily bombing of Sunnis, and ultimately paves the way for a political transition would do more to undermine Isis than any of the military or political steps being discussed.

在敘利亞，緩和衝突纔是重中之重，即使這意味着暫時擱置有關阿薩德最終命運的問題。首次有伊朗和沙特阿拉伯參與的維也納會談是個良好的開端。一份爲地方治理留有餘地、使人道主義援助成爲可能、終結阿薩德政權每天對遜尼派進行的轟炸、並且最終爲政治過渡鋪平道路的停火協議，比任何正在討論之中的軍事或政治措施都更能動搖ISIS的根基。