網路爭鬥 如何讓網際網路更開放大綱

Governments and companies are engaged in a battle to determine who can do what on the internet, and the outcome will reverberate around the world.
政府和企業正投入一場關於誰可以在網際網路上做什麼的戰鬥，其結局將在全球引起反響。

Google’s troubles in Europe over privacy, antitrust and the “right to be forgotten” are one example of this struggle. Multinational companies’ tussles with the US National Security Agency and Britain’s GCHQ over access to user data are another.
在歐洲，谷歌(Google)在隱私、反壟斷和“被遺忘權”(Right to be Forgotten)領域遭遇的麻煩，就是這場鬥爭的一個例子。跨國公司與美國國家安全域性(NSA)和英國政府通訊總部(GCHQ)圍繞使用者資料訪問權的角力是另一個例子。

At the same time some democracies and companies are working together against a coalition that includes most of the world’s authoritarian regimes in a struggle over how the internet should be governed, by whom, and to what extent states should be able to replicate physical borders in cyberspace. The outcomes of these clashes will affect everybody who uses the internet, determining whether it remains free and open as intended or whether we are left with a cyber space that is “Balkanised” and fragmented.
與此同時，一些民主國家和企業正聯合反對一個包括全球大多數威權政權的聯盟，中心問題是如何監管網際網路、由誰監管，以及政府可在何種程度上在網路空間複製實體世界。這些衝突的結局將影響所有使用網際網路的人，決定網際網路是否將按照各方的初衷，保持自由和開放？抑或我們將面對一個“巴爾幹化”、四分五裂的網路空間？

There are many reasons to work for an open, interconnected internet. It eases cross-border commerce and education, maximising economic opportunities. It enables otherwise isolated political, religious and sexual minorities to forge global alliances. The aftermath of the Arab uprisings has proved that unfettered internet access does not magically produce prosperity and pluralism – yet in the 21st century it is a precondition for spreading economic and political rights.
致力於一個開放且互聯互通的網際網路有很多理由。它將促進跨境商業和教育，最大化經濟機遇。它使孤立的政治、宗教和性取向少數群體能夠建立全球聯盟。阿拉伯暴動的餘波證明，不受約束的上網並不會奇蹟般地造就繁榮和多元化，然而在21世紀，它是擴充套件經濟和政治權利的前提條件。

Democracies and multinationals (with Google vocally in the lead) have appointed themselves champions of a “free and open” internet, despite a widening trust deficit with the public exacerbated by the revelations of Edward Snowden, the former NSA contractor turned whistleblower. They are working with experts and activists from around the world to promote what they call a “multi-stakeholder model” of internet governance and policy making. Here, business and “civil society” groups take a seat at the table on equal terms with governments to make decisions about the future of the internet.
民主國家和跨國企業（谷歌態度鮮明地領頭）自封為“自由且開放”網際網路的倡導者，儘管美國國安局前合同工愛德華•斯諾登(Edward Snowden)的爆料加劇了日益嚴重的公眾信任缺失。它們正與全球專家和活動人士合作，推廣它們所稱的網際網路治理和政策制定的“多方利益相關者模式”。在這種模式下，企業和“公民社會”團體平等地與政府坐在一起，就網際網路的未來做出決策。

China and Russia lead the camp asserting the sovereignty of governments. Both have made clear that using the internet to organise political opposition is a threat to “national security”. China’s internet is in effect an “intranet” that connects with the global system only at controlled choke points. Iran is working to build a “halal” or “pure” internet. President Vladimir Putin’s Russia is moving in a similar direction.
中國和俄羅斯是堅持政府主權陣營的領頭者。兩國都明確表示，利用網際網路組織政治反對活動是對“國家安全”的一種威脅。中國的網際網路實際上是一種“內聯網”，只是在受控的網路樞紐點與全球系統相連。伊朗正致力於建設一個“清真”的網際網路。弗拉基米爾•普京(Vladimir Putin)主政的俄羅斯正朝著類似的方向前進。If the “free and open” camp cannot do better to align words and deeds, it will lose. Further damaging revelations will emerge as long as people have reason to suspect their rights to privacy and freedom of expression are being violated.
如果“自由和開放”陣營無法更好做到言行一致，那麼他們將失敗。只要人們有理由懷疑自己的隱私權和言論自由正遭到侵犯，就會冒出更多具有破壞力的爆料。

For companies, the first step is to make public commitments to respect users’ rights, then implement those commitments in a transparent, accountable and independently verifiable manner. A grouping of democracies including the US and the UK, known as the Freedom Online Coalition, should implement policies that support a free and open global internet. These encompass greater transparency about surveillance practices, with genuinely “effective domestic oversight”.
對於企業而言，第一步應當是公開承諾尊重使用者權利，接下來是以一種透明、可問責和可獨立核實的方式落實這些承諾。包括美國和英國在內的民主國家聯盟（被稱為自由線上聯盟(Freedom Online Coalition)）應當實施支援自由且開放的全球網際網路的政策。這些政策包括利用真正“有效的國內監督”，提高監聽實踐的透明度。

Democracies’ pursuit of short-term political interests can contribute to fragmentation. Take Europe’s recent “right to be forgotten” ruling allowing citizens to request sensitive information be omitted from search results. Activists from Egypt to Hong Kong fear copycat steps in their countries will strengthen barriers to global information flows.
民主國家對短期政治利益的追逐可能加劇割裂。以歐洲最近的“被遺忘權”裁決為例，該裁決允許公民要求將敏感資訊從搜尋結果中刪除。從埃及到香港，活動人士擔心各自的國家效仿此舉，從而加大全球資訊流動的阻礙。

If even democracies cannot be trusted as stewards of an open internet, the power of all governments must be kept in check by companies and civil society through processes based in a common commitment to keep cyber space free and interconnected.
如果就連民主國家也不能被信賴為開放網際網路的守護者，那麼企業和公民社會必須通過基於保持網路空間自由且互聯互通的共同承諾的過程，約束所有政府的權力。

But if companies are to win civil society over to their side, activists must be able to trust them not to violate their privacy or restrict speech. Strengthening trust in public and private institutions that shape the internet should be a priority for anyone with an interest – commercial, moral or personal – in keeping global networks open and free.
然而，如果企業要將公民社會爭取到他們這邊來，活動人士必須能夠相信企業不會侵犯他們的隱私，也不會限制言論。加強對塑造網際網路的公共和私營機構的信任，應成為有意（無論是出於商業、道德還是個人利益）保持全球網際網路開放和自由的任何人的優先事項。