警惕三駕馬車危害希臘主權 My plan to resist the troika’s attack on Greek sovereignty

Aparadox lurks in the foundations of the eurozone. Governments in the monetary union lack a central bank that has their back, while the central bank lacks a government to support it.

一種矛盾隱藏在歐元區的根基之中。歐元區各國政府缺少一個支持它們的中央銀行，而歐州央行也缺少一個支持它的政府。

This paradox cannot be eliminated without fundamental institutional changes. But there are steps member states can take to ameliorate some of its negative effects. One such step that we contemplated during my tenure at the Greek ministry of finance focused on the chronic liquidity shortage of a stressed public sector and its impact on the long-suffering private sector.

如果沒有根本性的體制變革，這種矛盾就無法被消除。但是，成員國可以採取一些措施，減輕部分這一矛盾帶來的負面影響。我在擔任希臘財長期間所思考的一項此類措施，聚焦於壓力重重的公共部門的長期流動性短缺及其對長期受困的私營部門的影響。

In Greece, where the central bank is unable to support the state’s endeavours, government arrears to the private sector — both companies and individuals — have been a drag on the economy, adding to deflationary pressures since as far back as 2008. Such arrears consistently exceeded 3 per cent of gross domestic product for five years.

在希臘，央行無法支持國家的發展努力，政府對私營部門（包括企業和個人）的逾期債款一直拖累希臘經濟，加重了自2008年就出現的通縮壓力。此類逾期債款連續5年都超過了國內生產總值(GDP)的3%。

The phenomenon is both the cause and consequence of delayed tax payments to the state, reinforcing the cycle of generalised illiquidity.

這種現象既是延遲向國家納稅的原因，也是其後果，加劇了全面流動性不足的惡性循環。

To address this problem, our simple idea was to allow the multilateral cancellation of arrears between the state and the private sector using the tax office’s existing payments platform. Taxpayers, whether individuals or organisations, would be able to create reserve accounts that would be credited with arrears owed to them by the state. They would then be able to transfer credits from their reserve account either to the state (in lieu of tax payments) or to any other reserve account.

爲了解決這一問題，我們的簡單想法是利用稅務部門現有的支付平臺，讓政府與私營部門之間進行多邊債務互免。納稅人（不論是個人還是組織）將能夠開設儲備賬戶，將國家拖欠他們的債務金額計入其中。然後，他們可以將儲備帳戶中的信用分轉移支付給國家（代替繳稅），或轉移至任何其他儲備帳戶。

Suppose, for example, Company A is owed ㄠ洀 by the state; and it owes 30,000 to an employee — plus another 500,000 to Company B, which provided it with goods and services. The employee and Company B also owe, respectively, ㄠ　,000 and ㈠　　,000 in taxes to the state. In this case the proposed system would allow for the immediate cancellation of at least ㈠10,000 in arrears.

例如，假設國家欠A公司100萬歐元；而A公司欠一名員工3萬歐元，還欠B公司（爲A公司提供了商品和服務）50萬歐元。該員工和B公司還分別欠國家1萬歐元和20萬歐元的稅款。在這種情況下，該支付系統將使得至少21萬歐元的債務可以立刻抵消。

Suddenly, an economy such as Greece’s would acquire important degrees of freedom within the existing European monetary union. In a second phase of development, which we did not have time to consider properly, the system would be made accessible through smartphone apps and identity cards, guaranteeing that it would be widely adopted.

倘若如此，像希臘這樣的經濟體將突然間在當前的歐元區內獲得重要自由度。在第二個發展階段（我們沒有時間對此周密考慮），該支付系統將可以通過智能手機應用和身份證登錄，以保證它將被廣泛採用。

The envisaged payments system could be developed to create a substitute for fully functioning public debt markets, especially during a credit crunch such as the one that has afflicted Greece since 2010. Organisations or individuals could buy credits from the tax office online using their normal bank accounts, and add them to their reserve account. These credits could be used after, say, a year to pay future taxes at a discount (for example, 10 per cent).

可以開發出這種設想中的支付系統，用來替代功能齊全的公共債務市場，尤其是在信貸緊縮期間，例如自2010年以來困擾希臘的信貸緊縮期。機構或個人可以利用自己的普通銀行賬戶、以在線方式從稅務部門購買信用分，並將它們加入自己的儲備賬戶。這些信用分可以在一段時間（比如一年）後用來按折扣（如10%）繳納未來的稅款。

As long as the total level of tax credits was capped, and fully transparent, the result would be a fiscally responsible increase in government liquidity and a quicker path back to the money markets.

只要稅收抵免的總體水平設定了上限而且完全透明，結果將是以對財政負責的態度增加政府的流動性，踏上一條更快速回歸資金市場的通道。

Handing over the reins of the finance ministry to my friend, Euclid Tsakalotos, on July 6, I presented a full account of the ministry’s projects, priorities and achievements during my five months in office. The new payments system outlined here was part of that presentation. No member of the press took any notice.

7月6日，在將希臘財政部的領導權交給了我的朋友歐幾里德察卡洛託斯(Euclid Tsakalotos)時，我對財政部的項目、重點事項以及自己任職5個月期間的成績進行了詳細的介紹。這裏所概述的新支付系統就是那次介紹的一部分。但當時沒有任何媒體注意到這一點。

But when a subsequent telephone discussion with a large number of international investors, organised by my friend, Norman Lamont, and David Marsh of the London-based Official Monetary and Financial Institutions Forum, was leaked — despite the Chatham House rule we agreed with listeners, under which speakers are not identified — the press had a field day. Committed to unlimited openness and full transparency, I granted OMFIF permission to release the tapes.

但當隨後的一場與許多國際投資者的電話討論被泄露後——儘管我們與聽衆同意遵循的查達姆宮規則(Chatham House Rule)意味着發言者身份不被公開——媒體忙了一整天。這次討論是由我的朋友諾曼拉蒙特(Norman Lamont)和總部設在倫敦的官方貨幣與金融機構論壇(OMFIF)的戴維氠什(David Marsh)組織的。因爲承諾了無限制的開放和完全透明，我授權該論壇發佈了討論錄音。

While I understand press excitement about elements of that exchange, such as having to consider unorthodox means of gaining access to my own ministry’s systems, only one matter is of significance from a public interest perspective. There is a hideous restriction of national sovereignty imposed by the “troika” of lenders on Greek ministers, who are denied access to departments of their ministries pivotal in implementing innovative policies.

雖然我理解媒體對那次交流的細節（例如必須考慮使用非常規手段進入財政部系統）的興奮，但從公共利益的角度出發，只有一個問題意義重大。債權人“三駕馬車”對希臘國家主權強加了駭人的限制，使得希臘各部長無法進入自己的部門，而這些部門對實施創新性政策至關重要。

When a loss of sovereignty, arising from unsustainable official debt, yields suboptimal policies in already stressed nations, one knows that there is something rotten in the euro’s kingdom.

當主權喪失（源自不可持續的官方債務）導致已陷入緊縮的國家只能採取次優政策時，人們就可以知道歐元王國某個環節已經失靈。